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9Indispensable Nation?  
The United States in East Asia 
Michael Cox
At the end of World War II the United States faced three historic tasks: to recreate the conditions that would over time lead to the reconstitution of an open world economic 
system; to limit, and where possible, defeat the ambitions of those who after 1945 were 
pressing to push the world in a radically different direction to that favoured by America and 
its market allies; and finally, to incorporate old enemy states like Germany and Japan into an 
American-led international order. 
In order to achieve these goals the United States possessed at least two assets: a confident world view 
born out of success in a war that left it with massive global reach and a vast amount of power. That 
said, the challenges it confronted were enormous – nowhere more so than in Asia. Here a brutal war 
had not only devastated most countries in the region; only four years after Japan’s humiliating exit from 
the war, an authentic revolution actually occurred in arguably the most critical of all Asian countries: 
namely China. Whether or not the causes of communist success in China were the result of brilliant 
organisation, peasant discontent, the successful manipulation of nationalist sentiment or the backing 
of communist USSR (or a combination of all four) has long been debated by different generations of 
historians. Few though would dispute the hugely disturbing impact that the communist revolution in China 
was to have upon the wider Asian region. Nor could there be any doubt either about the implications 
of the Chinese communist revolution for the conduct of US foreign policy over the next three decades. 
Indeed, Mao Tse-Tung’s particular brand of revolutionary communism not only brought the Cold War 
to Asia and guaranteed a permanent American presence in the region that endures to this day; it was 
also the root of the United States’ decisions to intervene militarily on at least two occasions: first in 
Korea between 1950 and 1953, and then later in Vietnam, in an extended conflict that finally ended 
in America’s most humiliating defeat. If the Cold War remained cold in other parts of the world it was 
anything but in Asia.
This essay traces what in global terms must be seen as one of the great transformations of the modern 
era: that which turned one of the most devastated and disturbed regions in the world after mid-century 
into one of the more stable and prosperous by century’s end. The process of transition did not occur 
overnight. Nor did it occur without a mighty struggle between competing ideologies and rival states. 
But in the end, Asia – a most fiercely contested region for well over fifty years – underwent a massive 
change and did so, in part, because of the role played by the United States. Of course this came at a 
very high price in terms of lives lost, blood expended and democratic possibilities abandoned. Still, if the 
measure of success for any great power is the creation of an order in which its interests are guaranteed 
and its main rivals neutralised, then US policy in East Asia must be judged to have been successful. 
Nowhere was this more apparent than in Japan. 
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JAPAN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW 
ASIAN ORDER 
As an emerging world power in the nineteenth century 
it was almost inevitable that the United States would 
quickly come to view the Pacific Ocean as an American 
lake. Indeed, at a very early date in its history, the 
United States was to pursue an expansionist westward 
policy that brought it into conflict with Japan by 
the middle of the nineteenth century and imperial 
China by the end. Certain in the knowledge that 
its own brand of muscular Christianity and robust 
enterprise were superior to anything on offer in Asia, 
Americans, like most ‘normal’ imperialists, viewed the 
nations with whom they came into contact with a 
mixture of contempt – the Chinese, according to one 
American observer were ‘cold, snaky, slow, cowardly, 
treacherous, suspicious, deceitful people’ – laced with 
a large dose of nineteenth century racism. The peoples 
of Asia offered little by way of inspiration, it seemed; 
thus the best one could do was either convert them 
to the Christian faith or teach them western ways and 
hope that one day, after years of careful tutelage, they 
would become as civilised as Americans themselves. 
Ironically, the one country Americans seemed to admire 
most before being drawn into war with it was Japan, 
the only nation along the Pacific Rim that for a time, 
at least, looked to some in Washington as almost 
Anglo-Saxon in its desire to modernise its economy 
and state by imitating western methods. Initially a 
bulwark against imperial Russia (whose powerful navy 
Japan had defeated in 1904), later a counter to the 
USSR (after the revolution of 1917), and in possession 
of an altogether more developed material civilisation 
than that of decadent (and after 1911) disintegrating, 
China, until the early 1930s Japan seemed to be a 
natural partner for the United States in the Pacific. 
All this was to change, though very slowly, as Japan 
began its conquest of Asia, beginning with its 
annexation of Korea in 1910 (about which the United 
States hardly protested at all), continuing with its 
invasion of Manchuria in 1931 (which again did not 
provoke much by way of a US response), going on 
with its attack on China six years later, and concluding 
with its devastating conquest of much of the rest of 
Asia in 1941, followed shortly thereafter by its attack 
on the US Pacific fleet at anchor in Pearl Harbour. 
This ‘day of infamy’, as President Roosevelt was to 
call it, not only drew the United States into a Pacific 
War it had hitherto sought to avoid, but over time 
turned the United States into a permanent part of the 
Asia-Pacific strategic landscape, and later a major actor 
in Japan itself. Indeed, for at least seven years after 
the Second World War, the United State effectively 
governed Japan alone, and did so with a degree of 
cultural sensitivity and political acumen (made all the 
more necessary by the onset of the Cold War) that 
left an indelible and generally positive impression on 
the vast majority of Japanese. 
Critical to the success of the new post-war relationship 
was a recognition by Japan and its ruling elite – since 
1945 organised into the dominant Liberal Democratic 
Party – that Japan would accept its subordinate position 
to the United States in exchange for an American 
guarantee of its security. This in turn presupposed 
another bargain: between a United States willing – 
and indeed, enthusiastic – for Japan to concentrate 
most of its efforts on rebuilding and developing its not 
inconsiderable economic assets – critically dependent 
on ready access to the US market – in exchange 
for Japanese support for the United States in the 
larger international arena. Finally, underpinning the 
relationship was the understanding that while Japan 
might pursue certain external policies of its own, 
these would never be at the expense of regional 
order or US leadership. Japan, in effect, would be a 
semi-sovereign country.
No relationship remains entirely unchanged, and at 
times this very special relationship was to come under 
some strain, most notably in the 1980s, when high 
Japanese exports to the US began to create genuine 
economic disquiet in the United States. There were 
also a few on the Japanese right who continued to 
resent Japan’s semi-sovereign status, and during the 
1990s argued that Japan should now begin to say 
‘no’ to its powerful patron across the Pacific. However, 
greater assertiveness towards the United States was 
not something that generally tended to recommend 
itself. In part, this had to do with domestic politics 
and the fact that the Liberal Democratic coalition 
that had run Japan since 1947 had no interest in 
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challenging an America. It also had a good deal to do 
with economics: the relationship had brought Japan 
nearly forty years of sustained growth (albeit with a 
blip in the 1990s), and most Japanese had no desire 
to upset something upon which their future prosperity 
continued to depend. Finally, it had more than a little 
to do with the region within which Japan happened 
to find itself. Here there remained unresolved tensions 
on the Korean peninsula. Post-communist Russia 
continued to hold on to territory that Japan regarded 
as its own. And as one century gave way to another, 
Japan faced its first serious regional challenge in 
the shape of China. Indeed, even with the decline 
of the Liberal Democratic political stranglehold on 
Japanese politics – and stirrings of anti-Americanism 
in some quarters – the rise of China and the fears this 
generated in Tokyo guaranteed a close relationship 
with the United States. 
CHINA COMES IN FROM THE COLD 
If the foundational building block of America’s post-
war position in East Asia was its relationship with a 
one-time enemy, its greatest challenge was a nation 
with whom it had been closely allied until the late 
1940s. However, having ‘lost’ China the United States 
came to view Mao’s form of Marxism-Leninism as 
being especially threatening. Even as late as 1969, 
most Americans viewed China through a particularly 
hostile Cold War lens, a perspective reinforced at the 
time by the sheer turmoil through which China itself 
was then passing – the so-called Cultural Revolution 
– and by an increasingly desperate struggle America 
was waging in Vietnam against a communist enemy 
supported and armed by the Chinese (amongst others). 
To make matters worse, American conservatives, in 
particular, remained closely allied with the Republic of 
China (better known as Taiwan), whose leaders had 
every interest in continuing to foster distrust between 
policymakers in Washington and political leaders in 
mainland China.
The great strategic shift that initially broke the 
diplomatic deadlock and subsequently saw the United 
States opening up formal relations with Beijing has 
been described in great detail by both historians and 
students of international politics, including some of 
those who were involved in this most remarkable 
– almost revolutionary – of diplomatic reversals. It 
has also given rise to a lively debate as to why it 
happened. Thus, according to one school of thought, 
the new arrangement was the product of Chinese 
and American recognition that their greatest enemy 
was less each other and more the USSR. Others have 
stressed America’s effort to decamp as quickly as 
possible from Vietnam using China’s diplomatic clout 
as at least one instrument by which to limit the damage 
to its own position in the region. Some have even 
suggested a longer term American goal of opening 
up China, and by so doing enticing it back into the 
western fold. No doubt all these factors played a 
role, though what now seems to have been a near 
inevitable and irreversible process at the time looked 
anything but. For instance, if Mao himself had not 
died in 1976, if the Chinese economy had not been 
so weakened by his earlier policies, or if the USSR had 
not acted with such ineptitude in the late 1970s with 
its invasion of Afghanistan, then it is just possible that 
the rapprochement that followed may have taken 
much longer or may not have happened at all. But in 
the end it did, transforming the international system 
and drawing China away from the deep diplomatic 
freeze into it which it had been consigned since the 
revolution of 1949.
The US rapprochement with China, followed in turn 
by Beijing’s adoption of far-reaching economic reforms 
and ready acceptance that its own modernisation 
required an ever closer association with the global 
economy, set China on a new course that over the 
next twenty five years would have a major impact 
on both China and the world. Most obviously, by 
abandoning the path of revolution, China helped 
reinforce America’s temporarily weakened international 
position following its defeat in Vietnam in 1975. There 
is also a good deal of evidence to suggest that by 
working closely with the United States and placing 
more pressure on the USSR, China may have played 
a significant role, too, in bringing the Cold War to an 
end. Finally, its new alliance with the United States 
made possible the final defeat of Marxism as a serious 
political challenge to capitalism in the Third World. As 
the well-known American theorist Francis Fukuyama 
noted in 1989, the death of Marxism in the 1980s 
occurred for several important reasons, including its 
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own failure to produce efficient economies that could 
compete under world market conditions. However, 
it was the effective (if not formal) abandonment of 
Marxist-inspired planning in China that did as much 
as Gorbachev’s policies in the former USSR to make 
the case for liberal economics.
In spite of these critical changes, the relationship 
between the United States and post-Maoist China 
was never without its problems. Most obviously, the 
Chinese leadership were determined to ensure that 
economic change was not accompanied by political 
reform or a loss of control by the communist party – 
a development that in their view had had disastrous 
consequences for a once formidable USSR. China 
was clearly prepared to walk along the capitalist road 
previously feared by Mao; but it was not prepared to 
permit Chinese citizens the luxury of human rights 
or the freedom to choose their own political leaders. 
Secondly, there remained the outstanding issue of 
Taiwan, once the United States’ key ally in the early 
Cold War, and now a democracy whose very existence 
posed a very real problem for a Chinese leadership 
committed to a ‘one China’ policy. Finally, there was 
the very real long-term problem of the impact of 
China’s speedy rise on America’s position within the 
wider international system. Optimists could claim, and 
of course did, that a buoyant and dynamic Chinese 
economy was good for the American consumer 
(cheap imports), good for the American economy (as 
China bought up the US debt) and good for regional 
economic growth (critically important following 
the Asian financial crisis of 1998). Yet there were 
more than a few in the United States who remained 
concerned about where this new dynamism might 
one day lead. As one observer put it, the real issue 
was not whether China was rising peacefully or not, 
but rather what would happen after it had finally 
achieved its ascent? As the first decade of the twenty 
first century drew to an end, few Americans seemed 
to have a clear answer. 
THE UNITED STATES, KOREA AND THE LEGACY 
OF THE COLD WAR
If the Chinese leadership revealed a shrewd appreciation 
of how effectively a formally communist state could 
take advantage of the global economy without 
conceding any of its power at home, its neighbour 
– and formal ally – North Korea demonstrated an 
equally shrewd understanding of how to survive under 
conditions where the tide of history was moving 
against it following the collapse of communism in 
Europe. Indeed, like South Korea, the North drew 
some very important lessons from the collapse of one 
very special communist state in particular: namely East 
Germany. But whereas the leaders in the South drew 
the not unreasonable conclusion that the regime in 
the North was destined to change – and that the main 
policy goal should be to ensure that its evolution did 
not happen too rapidly – those in the North concluded 
that everything short of war had to be done to ensure 
that the communist state they had built at such cost 
since 1945 did not change at all. 
The method adopted by the North was a crude but 
simple one: using nuclear brinkmanship as a way of 
extracting concessions from its various opponents – 
most obviously South Korea – while forcing the wider 
international community (including the United States) 
to come to terms with the North. Fearful that its own 
survival was now in doubt, Pyongyang – whose nuclear 
programme had been raising some very real concerns 
in Washington since the late 1980s – began to push 
hard, and in 1993 even threatened to withdraw 
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Not 
surprisingly, this sounded a series of very loud alarm 
bells ringing in Washington, forcing policymakers 
to look at their very limited options – including the 
appalling (and impossible) one of conventional war. 
Out of this process finally emerged the decision to 
cut what to many at the time looked like the only 
deal possible: the so-called ‘Framework Agreement’ 
of 1994, a compromise solution that made a series of 
concessions to the North Korean regime – including 
delivery of large amounts of oil and aid – in exchange 
for a promise that they would remain party to the NPT. 
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Few believed the agreement was perfect. But hardly anybody could see any serious alternative, including a 
highly nervous South Korea, whose leaders by now were desperately keen to maintain some kind of relationship 
with a regime whose rhetoric they seemed to fear a good deal less than its collapse.
The adoption of what many in the United States regarded as a flawed policy forced upon them by North 
Korean intransigence on the one hand, and a South Korean desire to maintain some kind of relationship with 
the North on the other, soon came under attack within Washington. The 1994 deal, critics on the right argued, 
was little more than a modern day form of appeasement whose only consequence would be to preserve a 
regime already doomed by history. It would also allow the communists in Pyongyang to play a game of divide 
and diplomatic rule between the United States and its once steadfast South Korean ally. Equally serious, in 
the opinion of critics, it did very little to slow the North’s nuclear programme down in any meaningful way. 
Thus the Agreement was a failure in nearly every conceivable way. Naturally, no serious policymaker wanted 
confrontation for its own sake, but there was a desire to find a more robust approach to the North Korean 
problem, one that weakened this hideous regime rather than strengthening it, and punished it for its various 
transgressions – only one of which was having a nuclear programme – rather than rewarding it.
The incoming George W. Bush administration did not at first seek a major review of US policy towards North 
Korea. This though proved almost irresistible following the attack of 9/11 and President Bush’s announcement 
of an altogether tougher policy towards all ‘rogue’ regimes. Indeed, by early 2002, he was already counting 
North Korea as part of a wider ‘axis of evil’, and insisting that the policy of the United States towards it could 
be nothing less than regime change. Inevitably this provoked a response from the North Koreans, who once 
more threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which they did in 2003), while 
pushing ahead again with its stalled nuclear programme. Thus began what looked to many observers like a 
rather dangerous diplomatic game conducted between all the interested parties (not just the United States 
and North Korea); one, however, which failed to prevent the North from acting in an increasingly aggressive 
fashion – as exemplified in 2006, when it conducted its own missile tests and confirmed that it had, at last, 
exploded a small nuclear device. This deliberately planned provocation nonetheless had the intended effect of 
forcing its enemies back to the negotiating table, and in 2007 nuclear inspectors were once again admitted 
into North Korea, while Pyongyang committed itself – yet again – to the NPT. Finally, in November 2007, 
North and South Korea’s prime ministers met for the first time in fifteen years. 
North Korea thus posed many significant challenges for US foreign policy in the years following the collapse 
of communism in other parts of the world. If nothing else, it revealed that the end of the Cold War, whatever 
its wider promise, threw up as many problems as it did opportunities. What North Korea also illustrated was 
that critical issues such as nuclear weapons would not necessarily wither away once the Cold War came to 
an end. If anything, the end of the Cold War era made these problems even more difficult to solve. Finally, 
in attempting to deal with the policies of a failing regime on a divided Asian peninsula, the United States 
discovered something that many Americans seemed to have ignored in the unipolar age: that however much 
power one happened to possess, this alone did not solve some very real problems. Furthermore, since there 
was no problem more difficult to solve than North Korea, it required the United States to ‘get serious’about 
multilateralism and recognise that one had a much greater chance of solving these problems by acting with 
others, rather than acting by oneself. 1 
 
 
 
 
1 James Clay Moltz and C. Kenneth Quinones, ‘Getting Serious about a Multilateral Approach to North Korea’, The Nonproliferation Review, Spring 2004
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EAST ASIA: PRIMED FOR RIVALRY?
The continued division of Korea and the many challenges it posed for the United States pointed to something 
more general about East Asia even after the end of the Cold War: that the region continued to contain within 
it many serious fault lines that were not easily amenable to simple diplomatic solution. Here the contrast 
with Europe could not have been more pronounced. Indeed, scholars of International Relations have been 
much taken with the comparison, pointing out that, whereas Europe – both during and after the Cold War 
– managed to create some form of a ‘liberal security community’, East Asia had not. Indeed, according to at 
least one influential school of American thought, East Asia, far from being primed for peace after the Cold 
War, was instead ‘ripe’ for new rivalries. In fact, according to Aaron Friedberg, writing in an influential and 
much quoted article published in 1993, Europe’s very bloody past between 1914 and 1945 could easily turn 
into Asia’s future.2 Uncertainty about the future of North Korea, unresolved tensions between China and 
Taiwan, Japanese suspicion of China, China’s historical dislike of Japan, the persistence of authoritarianism, 
and last but not least, the legacy of a very bloody history stretching back many centuries, when taken together 
mean that the world in general – and the United States in particular – should remain deeply concerned about 
East Asia’s highly uncertain future. 
This pessimism (inspired as much by philosophical realism as by a deep knowledge of the region itself) has over 
the past few years given way to an altogether less bleak assessment by American analysts and policymakers. 
Few believe that East Asia will be without its fair share of difficulties going into the twenty first century. That 
said, there is probably more to look forward to than dread. 
First, the region has turned into one of the most economically dynamic in the world. Indeed, in global 
terms, the region now accounts for nearly 30 percent of world economic production. Nor does there seem 
much likelihood that it will slip backwards any time soon. On the contrary, the region overall appears to be 
economically ‘blessed’, not so much in terms of raw materials but in other, more intangible, but important 
assets including a culture of hard work – sometimes referred to as ‘Asian values’ – a plentiful supply of labour, 
a huge reservoir of capital, and a set of political and economic structures that allows the state to play a critical 
role in engineering successful economic outcomes. Nor in this lengthy list should one ignore the part played 
by the United States itself. Indeed, by opening its market to East Asian goods while providing the region 
with security on the cheap, the US has played what some would see as a very important part in generating 
stable growth throughout the region. 
Second, though many states in the region continue to have powerful and emotionally charged memories of 
past conflicts, in and of themselves these are not enough to generate new conflicts in the present, especially 
in circumstances where regional trade and investment are rising rapidly. East Asia certainly carries more than 
its fair share of historical baggage (much of this deliberately exploited by political elites in search of legitimacy). 
The fact remains that economic pressures and material self-interest are increasingly driving countries in the 
region together, rather than apart. The process of East Asian economic integration may have been slow 
to develop (ASEAN was only formed in 1967). Nor has integration been accompanied by the formation of 
anything like the European Union. However, once regionalism began to take off during the 1990s, it has 
showed no signs of slowing down. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Ripe for rivalry: prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia’, International Security (1993).
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A third reason for greater optimism is Japan itself, 
which in spite of an apparent inability to unambiguously 
apologise for past misdeeds, plays a most pacific role 
in the region. Indeed, having adopted its famous 
peace constitution while renouncing force as a means 
of achieving its goals abroad (Japan also remains 
one the strongest upholders of the original Non 
Proliferation Treaty), it has demonstrated no interest 
at all in upsetting its suspicious neighbours by acting 
in anything other than a benign manner. Furthermore, 
by spreading its not inconsiderable economic power 
in the form of aid and large-scale investment, it has 
gone a very long way in fostering better international 
relations in the region. Even its old ideological rival – 
China – has been a significant beneficiary, becoming 
home by 2003 to over 5000 Japanese companies. 
This leads us finally to the role of China itself. As we 
have already indicated, there are still some unanswered 
questions concerning China’s long term position in the 
world. A great deal of American ink has already been 
spilt worrying about ‘rising China’ and the threat this 
is likely to pose to its neighbours and to the United 
States. Yet here again there may be more cause for 
optimism than pessimism, in part because China itself 
has openly adopted a strategy (referred to as the 
‘peaceful rise’) that has been specifically designed 
to reassure other states that its economic ascent 
will not necessarily lead to new political or strategic 
problems. At the same time, China until very recently 
appears to have been more interested in building 
up its economic base at home rather than engaging 
in adventures abroad.
Yet the great unanswered question remains: can China 
continue to rise in its own region without causing fear 
amongst its neighbours and concern across the Pacific 
in Washington? Until the economic crisis of 2008 the 
answer to this would have almost certainly been a 
‘yes’. However, the last few years have seen the rise 
of new tensions in the region – in the South China 
Sea in particular – that have caused many states in 
East Asia to rethink their relationship with Beijing; and, 
in turn, look once more to strengthen their security 
partnership with the United States. 
 
THE UNITED STATES: STILL INDISPENSABLE?
Regional demands for a greater US presence point 
to America’s still significant role in East Asia. Indeed, 
even in an era when it has become fashionable to 
talk of a diminished US role in the wider world, one 
continues to be struck by how central the United 
States remains in the thinking of all actors in the 
region. Thus China, for all its bluster, still sees the US 
as a vital partner. South Korea remains dependent on 
the US for its protection. And a host of other states 
in South East Asia – from Japan to Taiwan – maintain 
important ties with Washington that they show little 
inclination of wanting to give up. Nor do any other 
states appear willing to play the wider role that the 
United States plays. 
At the end of the day, the position of the United States 
in East Asia is likely to endure for the very simple 
reason that many in the region have fewer doubts 
about its intentions than they do about many of their 
more immediate neighbours. East Asia may be in the 
process of shedding part of its bloody history, but 
the legacy of the past lives on to shape attitudes and 
beliefs in the region. More concretely, there are still a 
number of outstanding issues that remain unresolved 
and thus require an American presence to ensure they 
do not disturb the peace. So long as Taiwan worries 
about China, China resents Japan, and South Korea 
fears the North, there are few in the region willing 
to contemplate a future without the United States. 
If the US can be characterised as an Empire, then in 
East Asia it is one that remains a welcome guest at 
the high table of international politics. ■
